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Notes
CIvm LAW PROPERTY-IMMOVABLES BY DESTNrATION-Plain-
tiff sold an apartment building to the defendant, leaving five
venetian blinds in one of the apartments. Subsequently she
sought to recover these blinds, alleging they were her personal
property. The defendant contested the removal on the ground
that the blinds had become immovable by destination. Held, the
blinds did not become immovable and could be removed by the
plaintiff. Kelieher v. Gravois, 26 So. (2d) 304 (La. App. 1946).
This recent court of appeal case involves the interpretation
of Articles 467, 468, and 469 of the Revised Civil Code of 1870.
As the court pointed out, Article 468 provides for two dis-
tinct methods of immobilization.1
(1) By the owner's placing the movable in the service of
the "tract of land."2
(2) By his permanent attachment of the movable to a tene-
ment or building.
The first paragraph of Article 468 gives the essentials for
immobilization by the first method. It states: "Things which the
owner of a tract of land has placed upon it for its service and
improvement are immovable by destination." In the case at bar,
it was conceded that the blinds were placed on the building, by
the owner, thus meeting the initial requirement for immobiliza-
tion by destination.'
The court then discussed the problem under the premise
that "tract of land" as used in Paragraph 1 of Article 468, would
include the building in question.5 This view is supported by the
1. See Folse v. Triche, 113 La. 915, 37 So. 875 (1904); Bank of Lecompte
v. Lecompte Cotton Oil Co., 125 La. 844, 51 So. 1010 (1910).
2. Translation of French word Fonds, found in Article 524 of the French
Civil Code, corresponding to Article 468 of the La. Civil Code of 1870. For a
history and comparison of the two articles see Comment (1930) 5 Tulane L.
Rev. 90.
3. See Judge O'Niell's comment on this word in Straus v. City of New
Orleans, 166 La. 1035, 1050, 118 So. 125, 130 (1928).
4. Immobilization by destination always requires an act of the owner.
Hall and Lisle v. Mrs. Mary P. Wyche, 31 La. Ann. 734 (1879); Townsend
v. Payne, 42 La. Ann. 909, 8 So. 626 (1890); Richardson v. Item Co. Ltd., 172
La. 421, 134 So. 380 (1931); Folse v. Loreauville Sugar Factory, Inc., 156 So.
667 (La App. 1934).
5. Supported by French commentators. See 1 Planiol, Traite Elementaire
De Droit Civil (12 ed. 1939) §2219. See also Tulane L. Rev. note 2, supra.
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broad language used in Straus v. City of New Orleans,6 which
case implies that the term, "tract of land," would include fac-
tories, office buildings, and residences as well as land itself.
However, that case dealt with machinery in a cotton mill so it
would not necessarily be authority for extending the applica-
tion of Paragraph 1 of Article 4687 -to an apartment house. A
search of the cases fails to reveal one in which a movable was
declared immovable simply because it was in the service of a
commercial or residential building. All cases noted involving
such buildings have been grounded on the method of attachment
of the movable to the building." In the case of Scovel v. Shady-
side,' it was stated that Paragraph 1 of Article 468 is not ap-
plicable to a residential building.
Though the court conceded that an apartment building
would fall within the scope of a "tract of land" they neverthe-
less found that venetian blinds were not immovable by destina-
tion under Paragraph 1 of Article 468, as they were not for the
use or service of the building but rather for the convenience of
its occupants. The court has previously considered this distinc-
tion as a valid criterion of immobilization by destination;' but
the distinction is somewhat illusive. It is easy to see that a horse
used only for the pleasure of the owner of a plantation would
not be in the service of the plantation, whereas a horse belong-
ing to same plantation owner and used by the overseer to super-
vise the work of the plantation would be in the service of the
plantation and thus an immovable by destination.' It is not so
clear, however, whether venetian blinds serve the building or
its occupants.
In deciding the issue, it might be helpful to look to the rea-
6. Cited note 3, supra.
7. Note the examples under this paragraph in Article 468: cattle in-
tended for cultivation, implements of husbandry, seeds, plants, fodder and
manure, pigeons in a pigeon house, beehives, mills, kettles, alembics, vats,
and other machinery made use of in carrying on the plantation work, the
utensils necessary for working cotton, and saw-mills, taffia distilleries, sugar
refineries, and other manufactures.
8. Mackie v. Smith, 5 La. Ann. 717, 52 Am. Dec. 615 (1850); Folger v.
Kenner, 24 La. Ann. 436 (1872); L'Hote v. Fulham, 51 La. Ann. 780, 25 So.
655 (1899); Scovel v. Shadyside, 137 La. 918, 69 So. 745 (1915); Keifer v. Brad-
ford, 3 Orl. App. 351 (1906); Day v. Goff, 2 La. App. 75 (1925).
9. 137 La. 918, 69 So. 745 (1915).
10. Ibid. Morton Trust Co. v. American Salt Co. 149 Fed. 540 (C.C.E.D.
La. 1906).
11. The majority opinion cites this example 26 So.(2d) 304, 306 (La. 1946).
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soning of the French commentators in declaring a movable to be
immovable. Planiol 12 states,
"It was desired. to obviate the separation from a fonds 8 of
things that are its compulsory accessories, when such a sepa-
ration is contrary to the will of the owner and detrimental
to the general good. It is necessary that these accessories
follow the fonds in order that it may attain its maximum ef-
ficiency."
It can hardly be said that blinds in the case at bar are a
compulsory accessory of the house, for the house would serve
its purpose with or without them. Thus the most logical conclu-
sion would be that the venetian blinds are for the service of the
occupants only.
The second method of immobilization is found in the last
paragraph of Article 468, which states: ". . All such movables
as the owner has attached permanently to the tenement or build-
ing, are likewise immovable by destination." Although there
may be a tendency to confuse the issue, the better view appears
to be that service of the building is not requisite.1'
The test of immobilization under this second part of Article
468 is permanent attachment and Article 4691" is considered as
establishing the essentials of such -attachment." In brief, if a
movable is attached to a building by the owner, in such a manner
that its removal would cause appreciable damage to either the
building17 or the movable, or would leave the building in a rough
or unfinished condition,"8 it is said to be immobilized by destina-
tion under the idea of permanent attachment.
12. 1 Planiol, op. cit. supra note 5, at §2212. Since the French law rela-
tive to immovables is similar to that of Louisiana, French authorities have
often been consulted. Straus v. City of New Orleans, 166 La. 1035, 1054, 118 So.
125,132 (1928)" '... the opinions of the French commentators, on Article 524 of
the Code Napoleon, are as appropriate to article 468 of the Revised Civil
Code of Louisiana as they are to the article of the Code Napoleon'..."
13. See note 2, supra.
14. See 5 Laurent, Principes De Droit Civil Francais (2 ed. 1876) § 441;
Morton Trust Co. v. American Salt Co., 149 Fed. 540 (C.C.E.D. La. 1906).
15. Article 469 La. Civil Code of 1870: The owner is supposed to have at-
tached to his tenement or building forever such movables as are affixed to
the same with plaster or mortar, or such as can not be taken off without
being broken or injured, or without breaking or injuring the part of the
building to which they are attached.
16. Folger v. Kenner, 24 La. Ann. 436 (1872); L'Hote v. Fulham, 51 La.
Ann. 780, 25 So. 655 (1899).
17. Scovel v. Shadyside, 137 La. 918, 69 So. 745 (1915); Keifer v. Brad-
ford, 3 Orl. App. 351 (1906).
18. Mackie v. Smith 5 La. Ann. 717 (1850).
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In the principal case, the blinds were attached by small
metal brackets in much the same manner as ordinary window
shades. The damage, if any, occasioned by their removal would
be negligible. 19
Judge Janvier, in a concurring opinion, carefully pointed
out that in some modem buildings venetian blinds may be so
built into the building itself as to become immovable by destina-
tion under the idea of permanent attachment, but such was not
the fact in the case under consideration.
As was pointed out in the dissenting opinion by Judge Mc-
Caleb, the majority view ignored Article 467 of the Civil Code.
As amended by Act 51 of 1912,20 this article provides that some
eighteen enumerated fixtures21 are immovable by nature when
attached to the building by the owner for the use and conveni-
ence of the building. The court has found this article to be il-
lustrative and not exclusive. 22 Wire screens are specifically enu-
merated, and in his dissenting opinion Justice McCaleb, reason-
ing by analogy, states that venetian blinds would fall within the
scope of this article and should be declared immovable by nature.
Although Article 467 purports to establish immovables by
nature,2 it requires that the attachment be made by the owner,
for the use and convenience of the building. Apparently the same
difficulties would be met, under this article, in determining
19. In deciding that venetian blinds did not come under the purview of
this method of immobilization, the court applying literally the requisites
for attachment set forth in Article 469 said, "they are held in place by brac-
kets attached to the window frames by screws and are in no sense attached
to the building by plaster or mortar." 26 So. (2d) 304, 306 (La. 1946).
20. Article 467 originally provided "The pipes made use of for the pur-
pose of bringing water to a house or other estate, are immovable and are
part of the tenement to which they are attached."
21. Wire screens, water pipes, gas pipes, sewerage pipes, heating pipes,
radiators, electric wires, electric and gas lighting fixtures, bathtubs, lava-
tories, closets, sinks, gasplants, meters and electric light plants, heating
plants and furnaces, when actually connected with or attached to the build-
ing by the owner for the use of or convenience of the building are immov-
able by their nature.
22. Scott v. Brennan, 161 La. 1017, 109 So. 822 (1926).
23. In deciding that a vendors lien on a sprinkler system was not lost
by immobilization under Article 467, the court states "immovable by nature"
as here used could be considered as interchangeable with term "immovable
by destination" under Article 468. Tangipahoa Bank and Trust Co. v. Kent,
70 F. (2d) 139 (1934). Also see Cottonport Bank v. Dunn, 21 So. (2d) 525 (La.
App. 1945).
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whether the blinds were for the use of the building or its occu-
pants as were discussed previously in connection with Paragraph
1 of Article 468 and the same conclusion would be reached.
In conclusion, it is believed that venetian blinds could not
be held immovable under any of the articles discussed in the
light of prior jurisprudence interpreting these articles. It appears
that in determining what movables have become immobilized
by destination in an apartment house or residence, the most
practical test would be whether or not they are permanently at-
tached by the owner.
EDGAR H. LANCASTER, JR.
EXcEPTION OF NO CAUSE OF ACTION-AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES-
Plaintiff and defendant executed a solidary note which was to be
repaid by them jointly. After having called upon defendant
unsuccessfully for payment of one-half of the debt, the plaintiff
paid the note in full and brought this action for contribution.
The petition, after stating facts sufficient to constitute a prima
facie case, further alleged that the funds borrowed were used in
a joint venture which plaintiff and defendant had undertaken.
This surplusage was the basis of an exception of no cause of
action, filed on the theory that the petition disclosed a partner-
ship, the dissolution of which is prerequisite to suit by one
partner against another on partnership debts. Held, there being
exceptions to the general rule prohibiting actions by one partner
against the other prior to partnership dissolution,' the plaintiff's
petition did not show unequivocally that a cause of action could
not be maintained under one of these exceptions. Hence the
defendant's exception of no cause of action should be overruled.
West v. Ray, 26 So. (2d) 221 (La. 1946).
Two different procedural rules compete for supremacy
within the area occupied by this case. The first, that of con-
struing all ambiguities against the pleader,2 would seem to clamor
for a strict construction of the petition. The second, throwing
upon the defendant the burden of pleading and proving affirma-
1. Where the relief sought does not involve the taking of an accounting
of complicated or numerous partnership transactions, a partner may sue
another before dissolution. 21 A.L.R. 60. Also, an action may be maintained
before dissolution on a note given in pursuance of the articles of partner-
ship. Rondeaux v. Pedesclaux, 3 La. 510, 23 Am. Dec. 463 (1832).
2. Southport Mill v. Friedricks, 167 La. 101, 106, 118 So. 818, 820 (1928),
and cases cited therein.
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